Water usage is governed through a variety of mechanisms, including government ad-
approximation of how water markets could work in those Eastern United States, where states have adopted models of regulated riparianism. 4 Prior appropriation jurisdictions, which share many of the scarcity challenges Mediterranean regions are suffering, could also learn from Catalonia's experience. Most of these jurisdictions have adopted a permit system codifying the common law requirements and requiring users to apply before an administrative agency for a water right.
Part I describes the institutional system of water management in Catalonia. This is a necessary step in order to understand what measures could be taken to solve the mismatches between supply and demand, and more specifically, which gaps water markets could fill. Those mismatches and the status of water resources during the [2007] [2008] drought are examined in Part 11. Part III surveys the measures that were or could have been used to manage water scarcity in Catalonia-either by increasing supply or decreasing demand-and underscores the role that water markets could have played as mechanisms to help mitigate the effects of droughts and structural scarcity. The design and implementation of water markets in Catalonia is compared to the California experience, since water markets in Spain often look up to the Golden State's expertise. Part IV concludes by describing which lessons can be drawn from the response to the drought in Catalonia for other jurisdictions.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE CATALAN WATER SYSTEM
This section provides a novel, descriptive account of the institutional details of water supply in Catalonia, Spain. Barcelona and its densely populated suburbs provide a compelling case study because its issues with water scarcity mirror the struggles increasingly faced by urban areas throughout the world. Barcelona is not settled in the most water rich area, and its demand has long grown to levels where it exceeds immediate available supply, particularly when periodical drought episodes strike. This section offers an institutional overview of Catalonian water supply and usage.
In Spain, water is public property, and its management is controlled by administrative agencies. Typically, the water agencies deciding on the allocation of water are either the basin authorities (Confederaciones Hidrogrdficas) or the agencies set forth by regional government, depending on whether the basin is under the power of the central or regional government. In Catalonia, there are two relevant basin agencies: the Confederaci6n Hidrogrdfica del Ebro for the Ebro Basin, which is shared with several other regions, and L 'Ag~ncia Catalana de l'Aigua (ACA), which is in charge of the Internal Basins. 5 These two agencies are in charge of long-term planning and, following a cumbersome administrative procedure, granting permits for water use. The agencies may subsequently review the permits in order to reduce the volume granted. However, it is not common for them to do so because some user groups, like farmers, are extremely powerful. 6 The Spanish or Catalan legislative or executive branches 
5.
ACA is a public body which operates under private law for most of its activities. not only set the framework for these basin institutions, but they also make some of the operational decisions, even in times of emergency. 7 In the 2007-2008 drought, the Spanish government decided on the building of interconnections, and the Catalan legislature imposed duties on utility companies and passed general restrictions curtailing the water use rights of irrigators. 8 ACA also manages Aigiies Ter-Llobregat (ATLL), the main wholesale distributor in Catalonia. It supplies water to the gates of more than one hundred municipalities. 9 ATLL holds water use rights in different rivers of the Internal Basins, is the titleholder to several wells, and owns desalination plants. ' 0 In total, it supplies 65% of the water used in the Metropolitan Region. The other 35% is self-supplied from the different sources (surface water, groundwater, etc.) by the water utilities themselves. At the local level, the municipal government is responsible for water provisions in their municipalities, and it may decide to manage it publicly or to outsource management to a private company.
In the case of Barcelona, the private company Aigiies de Barcelona supplies the city and twenty-two other municipalities,' 2 serving as a good example of horizontal integration and explained possibly by economies of density. To supply Barcelona and its surrounding area, Aigiies de Barcelona buys water from ATLL and from desalination plants, and it holds surface and groundwater rights.
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It is important to note that farmers, especially those with small operations, do not hold permits. Instead they receive water from irrigation institutions, which hold the water rights licenses. In Spain, these institutions are organized in comunidades de regantes (irrigation communities), which are semi-public bodies. Farmers pay for their water, but tariffs are highly subsidized. The rate-setting power lies in the comunidad, but the basin authority has veto power.
1 4 The members of these communities were the potential sellers in the water markets discussed in the Segre and Ebro regions during the 2007-2008 drought. The interlocutors of the public administrators were not individual farmers but these communities, the Comunitat General de Regants Water scarcity is defined as the situation in which "demand exceeds the water resources exploitable under sustainable conditions."' 19 Scarcity is a growing problem in regions all over the world. The Barcelona metropolitan area suffers from a structural water deficit-a negative water balance-because local water demand is higher than water supply. It is structural because the deficit is not only present in times of drought. Droughts worsen the problem. There are two water regions in Catalonia. One water region is supplied by the Ebro River Basin, which is a basin shared with other Spanish regions. The other, slightly larger water region is supplied by the Internal Basins, that is, rivers which only flow within Catalan territory. Given the interregional nature of the Ebro River, it is managed by a Basin Organization, the Confederaci6n Hidrogrfica del Ebro. Though the regional governments are represented in this organization's governing bodies, the Spanish central government plays the leading role with the greatest number of votes in the collegiate decisionmaking bodies and the power to appoint the highest official. 20 The Internal Basins are managed by an agency of the Catalan regional government (ACA), which also plays the role of the Basin Organization required by the 2000 Water Framework European Directive.
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These two water regions in Catalonia are different in many dimensions. For example, they have a very different distribution of uses. Ninety-five percent of the demand in the Catalan area supplied by the Ebro Basin is devoted to agricultural use, while only 36% of the demand supplied by the Internal Basins goes to agriculture. 22 The other 64% of demand is distributed in the following way: 43% for urban uses and 21% for industry.
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The Ebro is the more plentiful of the Spanish rivers, while the Internal Basins are more stressed watercourses. The Internal Basins, which cover 40% of the total Catalan demand, are the source of water for 92% of the Catalan population, mainly because they supply 26 This distribution shows two characteristics of current scarcity crisis: the disparity between where water is allocated and where population concentrates and the tension between uses, because the majority of water is allocated to agricultural areas. The solutions employed by Catalan may serve as an example for many other jurisdictions with similar problems. The Internal Basins are composed of mainly two systems: the Ter River and the Llobregat River, which are increasingly interconnected. 27 The stressed Llobregat River flows into the Barcelona area, but not the Ter River, 28 which is more plentiful and supplies more water. Infrastructure was established to ensure supply from the Ter to the Metropolitan Area, to which this river is the principal contributor. 29 Both rivers have been dammed in order to mitigate the uneven temporal distribution of water, guaranteeing supply. 30 Interconnections solve problems of spatial distribution, and dams level out temporal distribution. But the evolution of supply and demand, coupled with drought crises, has deemed these measures insufficient.
The spatial deficit makes the Barcelona area very dependent on neighboring areas. This deficit is particularly troublesome in an area with climate variability, which means that water is unevenly distributed across the year and across the territory. In drought times, 24 [Vol. 51:731 when rainfall drops, the problem becomes more acute. The problem is likely to get worse, given the expected impact of climate change in Mediterranean regions.
Barcelona, like many other cities all over the world, is not located in the most water abundant area. In addition, Barcelona and Catalonia in general have suffered from the same drivers of scarcity that regions all over the world face, making the deficit worse. Those drivers are population growth and urban sprawl, which go hand-in-hand with changes in consumption patterns. Barcelona's Metropolitan Area has increased from 3.5 million inhabitants to 4.5 million inhabitants in the last forty years. 31 Rather than population increasing in the main city, it has increased in the outer zones of the metropolitan area where density is much lower. 32 Urban sprawl is associated with more spacious houses with small gardens or swimming pools. Those areas consume more than dense cities and town in the metropolitan area and have driven the absolute increase in water consumption.
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Furthermore, urban development planning has not always adequately taken into account future water needs. As a consequence, nowadays, some cities are struggling for water because that is where population changes have concentrated. Water demands should be included in urban planning strategies. In some places, cities seem to have learned from past mistakes and have started to integrate land use and water supplies. Californian legislatures and courts have required developers to include in their plans water supplies ensuring future reliability. 34 The deficit of the Internal Basins is estimated to be around 300-350 hm 3 per year.
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Like in many other jurisdictions, while these changes took place, water allocation did not vary substantially. The agricultural sector has been, and is, the main consumer of water in many regions all over the world as a result of its historical relevance and the fact that water is one of the main production inputs for irrigated agriculture. Globally, agriculture is responsible for 70% of all withdrawals of fresh water. 36 This is a common pattern in the distribution of water across uses in several jurisdictions. The agricultural sector uses 75% in Spain. 37 As in many other jurisdictions, the mismatch between this figure and the contribution of agriculture into the gross domestic product 38 is usually criticized. Farmers 42 The reservoirs were at around 20% of their capacity. 43 The crisis ended thanks to rain, but it is likely that similar water crises will arise again because of the area's water deficit.
As the next section will explain, the options available to the Metropolitan Area to tackle its structural deficit are similar to those available to water stressed regions around the world. The measures will be discussed in relation to the 2007-2008 drought crisis too. In addition to purely demand side or supply side measures, the analysis will finish with the roles that water markets could have played in this drought management. 39. Glennon, Water Scarcity, supra note 1, at 1888 ("Let's be clear about one thing: we are talking about transfers from rural farming areas to cities. Most of the water that will sustain the expected 15 million additional Californians is going to come from agriculture. It has to."). A 10% improvement in agricultural water use may be enough to satisfy urban demand, though climate change may make a greater improvement necessary. PETER 
IV. SOLUTIONS TO STRUCTURAL DEFICIT AND PERIODICAL DROUGHT

A. Demand Solutions
On the demand side, there are several measures of different natures that could be taken. Economic incentives, in particular price increases, are solutions favored by economists. Price increases translate into demand reductions. In fact, the ACA argues that while price increases have reduced consumption, the change in consumption habits" and other factors, such as population growth, have outweighed the savings achieved in absolute terms. An alternative to price raises are soft measures that have few short-term effects but may have long-term benefits. An example of this type of measure is the public educational campaigns about efficient water use in our homes, which are common in Catalonia. 45 Similarly, the awareness of the water problems can translate into a decrease in consumption. Amidst a drought, the government adopts mainly short-term demand measures, beyond the voluntary reduction by household users, corresponding to the given need for immediate relief. On April 3, 2007, the Catalan Government adopted exceptional and emergency measures in relation to the use of water resources. 5 52. Id. There were three main scenarios. The level one scenario employs measures which will ensure that water will be available in the medium-term. The level two scenario establishes tighter measures to guarantee domestic uses in the short-term. The level three scenario, or emergency scenario, is the most serious one and entails extraordinary and serious restrictions, including restrictions to household consumptions (for example, water could have been unavailable at nights). For example, the Ter-Llobregat system enters into a level I scenario when the level of reservoirs drops below 33 percent. The center will enter into a level two scenario if the stored water is below 23% of reservoir capacity. If the reservoir drops to below 20%, then the systems enters the emer- and the seriousness is measured according to the amount of water in the reservoirs. Here the measures are going to be analyzed according to whether they are targeting the demand or the supply side.
Diverse obligations were imposed on water utility companies, municipalities, households, farmers, and industries by this Decree. 53 The principal measures implemented were restrictions on irrigation. 54 The underlying assumption seemed to be that the water marginal value is lower in agriculture than in domestic or industrial uses. The Decree established the maximum amount of water that can be taken from the river for irrigation purposes, thereby curtailing the farmers' permits. 55 The amount of water available for crops decreased depending on the seriousness of the drought situation. For example, initially the restriction set less water available for all the crops, but if drought aggravated, restrictions were established at the level of survival for perennial crops, like fruit trees, which have high fixed costs. 56 At that point, there was no allocation for less valuable crops. Almost any measure or limitation adopted-for example, restrictions on irrigation rights-were not compensable, except the ones that were a direct takings. 57 However, it must be noted that the lack of direct compensation for the restriction on irrigation rights was somehow cancelled out by the direct subsidies that farmers received for the loss of crops due to drought.
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Water use by municipalities were also restricted starting from level 1 scenarios.
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They could not use water of quality suitable for human consumption for uses other than that, like irrigating public parks. 60 This measure can have long term effects because systems for reusing water for irrigation of public areas or fountains could create permanent water savings-as it has been the case in the city of Barcelona. There are examples not too far away, like Sevilla, where household water suffered severe restrictions from 1992 to 1996; there were periods where water was unavailable for up to ten hours per day. , the subsidies have essentially become loans offered by a public institution at lower interest rates. For example, the farmers growing flowers received loans to distribute the losses caused by the drought over several years. In addition, given the current financial crisis, they received subsidies to cover these already favorable loans, see ORDRE AAR/433/20 10, de 6 de setembre, per la qual es convoquen cls ajuts per bonificar els costos financers dels prdstecs per la sequera de 2008 als titulars d'explotacions agrries de flor i planta ornamental [Order AAR/443/2010, Sept. 6, announcing the call for subsidies for owners of flower and decorative plant farms in order to pay for the financial costs of loans related to the 2008 drought], (DOGC 5713, 2010 Restrictions on household consumption were the last resort, they would have only been adopted in emergency scenarios. But local authorities-which are the level of government responsible for urban water supply-are empowered by the Decree to adopt immediate measures to ensure an efficient use of water. 62 For example, they could restrictively regulate the irrigation of private gardens, patios, or lawns. 63 In fact, the Catalan government conditioned on the adoption of these measures the funding for infrastructure projects to reduce the burden on current local, water supplies or to increase water supplies 64 In addition, a mandate to plan and implement measures to reduce water stress was imposed on water utility companies supplying areas of more than 20,000 inhabitants. For example, Aigiies de Barcelona, in Barcelona, decided to improve the conveyance infrastructure by reducing leaks and reducing water pressure, which reduces consumption and conveyance losses. 65 Thus achieving a 2% reduction in the volume of water used. 66 As shall be seen, the curtailments established and the shielding of domestic uses prevents the market from fulfilling a similar reallocation where every user faces the real cost of the water.
B. Supply Solutions
Water supply is generally considered fairly inelastic given the high costs of "producing" new water. The traditional solution for increasing supply has been to build dams to smooth the availability of water across the year. But this is no longer an option in Catalonia because of the number of dams already present in both internal river systems and the high political, economic, and environmental costs of building new dams. Water supply could, however, be increased in several other ways in Catalonia. First, without resorting to new sources of water, water availability could be increased by improving existing infrastructure in order to reduce transportation losses. For example, in Barcelona, 25% of the water that enters into the system is not billed, 67 and in Badalona, a city in the Metropolitan Area, a pipe lost more than 9,000 liters of water per hour for weeks. 68 Second, even though groundwater is already a source for Barcelona, more aquifers could be utilized if they were restored, properly managed, and sometimes cleaned. Fifth, water could be transferred from other areas, but transporting water is expensive because it requires either infrastructure or tankers. For example, a transfer from the Rh6ne River (France) to Barcelona has been perennially discussed because this plentiful river does not suffer the same climatological stressors as the Catalan ones. Interbasin water transfers, whether they have an international component or not, are always contentious because they are environmentally and economically costly and politically controversial. The situation became harsher in 2008, given the negligible precipitations that the area received during 2007. 75 In April of 2008, the reservoirs were at 20.14% of their capacity. The domestic restrictions were close. If the stored water dropped below 20% of reservoir capacity, households will suffer restrictions. These were expected for October 2008 at the latest. At that time, a transfer from the Segre River, which is part of the Ebro Basin, was debated to alleviate the situation. 76 The connection between the Ebro Basin and the Internal 69. ROGERS & LEAL, supra note 39, at 28-36.
70. ACA, https://aca-web.gencat.cat (follow "English"; then follow "Plans and programmes"; then follow "Planning"; follow "Reuse in Catalonia").
71. Reuse, ACA, http://aca-web.gencat.cat/aca/appmanagcr/aca/aca?_nfpb-truc& ageLabel=P1206854461208200613421&profileLocale=cn (follow chart "Evolution of volume of water reused by use").
72. See ACA, Dessalinitzadora del Prat (follow "English"; then follow "Action"; then follow "Desalination Plants"; then follow "Prat Desalination Plant"). The capacity of the Tordera Desalination Plant was enlarged, and the Llobregat Desalination plant was inaugurated in 2009. These are the amounts they can produce, but actual production is adjusted according to the availability of traditional sources of water. See La dessalinitzadora de la Tordera, ACA, http://aca-wcb.gencat.cat/aca/appmanager/aca/aca?_nfpb=truc&_pageLabel=P18400839711246274517685& nfls=false (follow Tordero desalination plant).
73 The connection entailed a transfer pipe, which was not a mammoth project. It was relatively cheap to install and it did not have a huge environmental impact. The project was designed to be installed in the median of the highway that unites Barcelona with Tarragona (AP-7). Even though a pipe can be useful to send water either way, it seemed clear who would be the recipient anytime: the Metropolitan Region. To calm the protests from the Tarragona region, it was decided that the structure would be temporary. 80 The expected per year, and this water was part of the allocation from the Ebro that Tarragona was not consuming. There had been a huge opposition to the initial Ebro transfer, which the Socialist party had used as an electoral platform. The Socialist Party held many positions in the government when the Tarragona connection was being debated. Public discontent, channeled through the organizations that opposed the previous plan, targeted the Socialist central government, the Socialist Party, and other left-wing parties in Catalonia because they allowed this smaller connection after having opposed the previous one. 83 Detractors feared that once the faucet opened, there would be no way to stop Barcelona from receiving as much water as it wished given its capital relevance and to the detriment of southern rural and small urban areas and the environment. 84 Given the opposition to the project, it
was not even called a transfer in order to circumvent the stigma it had tied to it. Instead, it was called catchment, a less loaded word. While the Ebro project was in the early stages, given the immediacy of the crisis, water started being shipped to Barcelona by boat from Tarragona, which had a surplus of groundwater, to Marseille and the Provence Canal in France. The ships were expected to carry around 1.66 hm 3 per month, which would have fulfilled around 6% of the demand in the Metropolitan Area while the drought period lasted. This was an incredibly expensive source, even though transportation was cheaper thanks to the harbor fee waiver granted by 2001. Its provisions regarding transfers to the Catalan Internal basins and the Segura and Jucar Basins were particularly polemic with plenty of public opposition. For example, the "Plataforma per la Defensa de l'Ebre" an association for the defense of the Ebre River which was started by citizens of the area near its delta-organized a demonstration on September 9, 2001 in front of the European Institutions in Brussels. For a report on the different protests, see Instituto Aragonds del Agua, Cr6nica de la lucha contra el trasvase (Report on the struggle against the transfer), http://www.aragon.es/DepartamentosOrganismosPublicos/Organismos/InstitutoAragonesAgua/AreasTematicas/PlanHidrologicoNaciona (follow "Cr6nica de la lucha contra el trasvase") (last vis- 
C. Water Markets, the Missing Piece
Finally, there is the option of pursuing policies that affect both supply and demand: water markets. Those were the missing pieces of the response to the 2007-2008 drought in Catalonia.
By water markets, I consider any mechanism, temporary or permanent, which allows users with different marginal values to transfer the right to use water. The most common experiences are water banks, environmental water accounts, and contracts between private parties. Each of them requires different roles from the government. For example, in a water bank, the administrative agency responsible plays the role of a broker, which may imply some backup functions necessary at early stages of market development since parties might be unfamiliar with water transactions. But even if the market consisted only of private contracts, government would have to play certain roles, such as reviewing transactions for externalities, given the potential failures present in water markets. The lack of governmental spur might be the reason why water markets have not been a useful tool in Spain even though they are legally feasible.
The purpose of water markets are to bring water from water-abundant to waterscarce areas by reducing water demand from low value uses, such as agriculture, and supplying that water to higher-value users, such as urban users. If markets existed, the drought situations should not become as harsh as they are nowadays in regimes like the Spanish one, where the agency responsible for water allocation decides which categories of rights to curtail, without paying attention to the specific marginal values of their right holders. If users could buy, sell, or lease their rights, the expected result is that those who value the water most will be the primary ones who use it, thus reducing the potential losses from a drought. Furthermore, given that increasing the water supply is not a solution in addressing the scarcity problem in the majority of region, markets could provide a way to reallocate 85 water. The majority of regions are already over allocated and new sources, such as desalination, are too expensive. But markets would provide a far more flexible system, without political distortion.
Markets would provide farmers with the incentives to adopt efficient irrigation techniques or to adjust their crop types, and would allow users to shield their risks of curtailment. Markets, thus, are both a demand side measure and a supply side one, ensuring that water flows to those who value it the most. Demand in the agricultural sector would decrease because the benefit from using the water to irrigate is lower than the benefit they will obtain from selling it. Given that they reduce demand, any supply available for other users would increase because the water rights that irrigators hold are for lease or sale. These mechanisms should be less controversial than mandated transfers since mandated transfers decrease supply in the region of origin that could translate into environmental problems and restrictions for the right holders during future droughts. If markets existed, the right holders of these regions could decide whether to lease or sell water and benefit from it. Similarly, administrative mandated cuts assume uses are more or less valuable and reduce their permits, but such an assessment by the administration is likely to be less precise than decentralized private parties decision when facing the real cost of water. Farmers could choose to irrigate or sell it to urban utilities. Urban utilities may decide to reduce their customers' demands by increasing the price, adopting other measures, or buying the water from farmers. However, such a scenario will not likely be realized in Spain because water market regulation is flawed, as the next subsection will demonstrate by using California as a benchmark. Emergency measures further hinder water markets.
Water Markets Regulation in Spain: A Bad Disciple of California
Water rights in Spain were transferable under the 1985 Water Act, but transactions were few since the procedure was so cumbersome, taking up to eighteen months to get an approval of the transfer between two private parties. 88 In 1999, an overhaul of Spanish water regulation was introduced. Two different types of exchanges were allowed: first, leasing contracts-private parties could enter into lease contracts for water use permits8 9 -and second, exchanges within the framework of a water bank allowing them to sell or lease these to other users. A water bank is an administratively-run clearinghouse where the agency establishes the buying and selling price and issues permits for holders to sell or lease their water use rights to the bank. 9 0 The drought period in the early 90s was a precursor of this regulation, but as will be explained in the next section, it was not enough to prevent the harsher effects of the mid 2000s drought or to resolve the structural problem. Since Spain is an example of a Mediterranean jurisdiction, this quotation supports the meaningfulness of the comparison chosen here. In fact, drawing on similar characteristics, Arroyo and Naredo, two Spanish scholars, offered in their 1997 book a descriptive comparison of Californian and Spanish water policy, 94 including its markets.
When debating water markets in the Spanish Congress, opposing parties in Spain treated the Californian experience strategically. The Socialist Party, in the opposition at the time of the reform, defended water banks based on the Californian experience, but explicitly opposed markets. 95 In contrast, Mr. Blanco, the right wing party Water Secretary, regarded California as a successful experience-but his reform went beyond water banks, which many seemed to consider the only transfer mechanism available in California. 96 The potential negative effects are attenuated because the user can only transfer the average volume that was used during the last five years.
juridico de los procedimientos dc desalaci6n o de reutilizaci6n, de otro, potenciar ]a eficiencia en cl empleo del agua para lo que es necesario la requerida flcxibilizaci6n del actual rdgimen concesional a travrs de la introducci6n del nuevo contrato de ccsi6n dc derechos al uso del agua, que permitiii optimizar socialmente los usos de un recurso tan escaso. [In this sense, the experience of the intense drought suffered by our country in the early years of the final decade of this century, calls for the search of new alternative solutions, which, regardless of the best reallocation of available resources through planning mechanisms. These new solutions should, on the one had, increase water production using new technologies, granting legal status to legal procedures desalination or reuse, and, on the other, enhance efficiency in water use given the flexibility needed under the current concession regime through the introduction of the new contract for the transfer of rights to use water, which will optimize socially uses of such scarce resource].
92. 98 These figures suggest that water markets have not been very active, and activity is a good proxy for success in this case. 99 Three important considerations regarding the leases must be noted because they partially explain why those tools were not widely used in Spain. First, water lease contracts must respect the legal ranking of uses, that is, water should be leased to users ranked at a same or higher level. In relation to this first point, it is important to highlight that leases only operate between sellers and buyers who are already users.
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The default ranking, which is the same as that established in the 1985 Water Act, is set in Article 59 of the Consolidated Water Act, but the River Basin Plans can modify it. 101 The default ranking is as follows: domestic users and small industry connected to the municipal water net; agriculture; hydroelectric or other electric power producers; industry; fish farms; recreation; navigation. This ranking purportedly expresses the public interest.
102 But, the ranking seems to be more a proxy of the social valuation of water, probably lagging behind current times, anchored in the times when we were an agricultural society. Another hypothesis is that the relative abstract inelasticity of demand of the different uses which assumes that domestic consumers and farmers cannot do without water. This requirement of respecting the ranking in water transactions should not be an obstacle in times of drought since the idea behind water exchanges is that farmers could save water or fallow their fields because they either can increase their efficiency or lose the annual crop. They can sell it to other farmers growing higher value crops or to urban water suppliers selling water to domestic users, which are always at the top of the ranking. In addition, the ranking requirement can be waived in certain emergency scenarios. [Vol. 51:731
Even though it seems to be less of a deterrent in practice because we assume water will be coming from the agricultural sector, the regulation is still far from optimal. The rank decided by the agency is a very rough proxy for marginal value since there might be an industry whose marginal value is higher for the extra twenty liters of water per day it needs to meet a peak in production and its water demand is very inelastic. However, industry use is ranked lower than agricultural use; thus, industry cannot lease from a farmer. Furthermore, new users cannot buy water from current users. This means that new entrants have to apply for new permits even though streams may be over-allocated. This approach is highly different from California's private transactions. Not only do rank of order limitations not exist, but also, Senate Bill 610 and Senate Bill 221 of 2001 establish that new urban developments have to ensure that water is available for the next twenty years and transfers are among the sources they can rely on to prove that supply is ensured.' 03 However, the 1991 California Drought Water Bank included some priorities into its framework: there were rules to prioritize among different buyers according to how serious the effects of the shortage would be for them. Demands arising from emergency situations related to health and safety were to be satisfied first, then critical needs such as those of urban users receiving less than 75% normal supply or farmers growing permanent crops. Yet, these priorities did not need to be applied since there was less demand for water than water purchased and, thus, the California Department of Water Resources ensured more water flow and carry-over storage.1 4 The restrictions in Spain-ranking of uses and transferring only to another usercould be justified if they translated into a less demanding review procedure because transactions that are less prone to affect third parties are the only ones allowed in the first place. Before the 1999 Amendment, when those restrictions did not exist, to complete a transaction, the authorization process was extremely cumbersome. After the Amendment, the procedure to authorize a transaction was shorter (two months), but the procedural steps were not spelled out. There is no guidance on who has the burden of proof or what the role of participation is for third parties. California has a cumbersome procedure that differentiates between long-term and short-term transactions, but guidance on the procedural steps indispensable to get that transaction through abounds.
The second problem regarding the lease mechanism is that the approval of such a transaction does not imply the authorization for the construction or use of pipes, canals, and mains. When infrastructure is private and used for permit leases, regulations establish that the owner of the infrastructure and the parties to a transaction need to agree. There is no imposition of common carier duties. 105 The regulation does not rule out direct denial of permission to use or other practices such as discriminatory rates. When the infrastructure is public, the approval for the use of the infrastructure is independent from the approval of the transfer. This additional approval seems quite an unnecessary duplication of proceedings since the same administrative body-the agency managing a basin-authorizes both. Provided the infrastructure has spare capacity, there is no need for many other findings because externalities will have already been considered when reviewing the transfer. Interestingly, even the periods to decide on the transfer and on the use of infrastructure are different with the period for the use of infrastructure being longer (four months). However, a positive feature is that if the administration does not decide on time, the use of infrastructure is considered authorized. California also separates procedures if there is a need for authorization to ship water using the infrastructure, but there is a clear duty to allow third parties to transfer water using up to 70% of unused capacity.1 0 6
In Spain, the consensus among lawyers who deal with lease contracts is that the authorization for the use of existing infrastructure is less of a hurdle than the use of interbasin infrastructure, 0 7 since the latter always implies a delay and involves more complex transactions, given its greater potential for externalities. In some cases, this may become a political question, and some externalities might be disregarded to serve particular interests.
This was the case during the 2007-2008 drought crisis. In addition to the Ebro transfer, the Decree also authorized the use of the pipe for transporting water under water leasing contracts, a market mechanism. The Real Decreto-Ley authorized public agencies or private actors designated by the Autonomous Community authorities to buy rights from farmers who are members of an irrigation community in the Ebro Region. These sales which would not have been part of a water bank could not be banned by the irrigation community, but the community must send a report to the Ebro Hydrographic Confederation, the basin authority which has the power to approve the contact. This authorization did not follow the path set forth in the Consolidated Water Act, and instead it opted for an open authorization before anyone applied for it; therefore, externalities would have been disregarded. However, the connection was never built. A lack of connections contributes to the failure of water markets, and are also a consequence of that failure. The connections discussed, like that in Ebro, do not imply a great investment. But, if there are over-allocated rivers, those infrastructure connections only make sense when transactions are likely to happen. In Catalonia and Spain, transactions are not likely to happen.
Some high-ranked officials of the Catalan Water Agency half-heartedly tried to dress up this Ebro transfer as a scheme to buy irrigators rights, as they had done when arguing for the connection between Segre agricultural region farmers and urban districts.
108 Surprisingly, irrigators in the Ebro region did not agree to water exchanges, and instead they were willing to save water collectively and freely send it to the Barcelona's Metropolitan Area. 09 This evidences the lack of market culture for water. 109. See id. They might have fear the application of Article 65 of the CWA, which empowers the agency to review the licenses granted if it assesses that the holder needs less water to fulfill his needs. There is no clear protection against this article, but it might be implicit since it is expressly establish that water rights lease contracts (Article 69) will not affect the lapsing of the license (Article 66) which is triggered if the user if use is interrupted for three years in a row.
[Vol. 51:731 water was sold, one would assume they did not need it and, thus, their rights would be forfeited.
This fear is precisely the third problem that leases encounter. Like in California, water rights must be used in Spain; if they are not, they are subject to forfeiture. In Spain, the period of non-use is three years while in California it is five. Both jurisdictions also have provisions ensuring that water is used reasonably. In California, appropriative rights are subject to beneficial use requirements and in Spain, permits could be revised if the River Basin Authority (RBA) determined the same goal could be achieved with less water.' " 0 The California Water Code has been amended several times to ensure that those transferring water are certain that their underlying right is not going to be affected."' Conversely, Spain has fallen short and has failed to enact any provision particularly tailored to calm those fears.
Water Exchange Centers
Water Exchange Centers (centros de intercambio de derechos) are structures inspired by California's experience in 1991, 112 and agencies play the role of match-maker. However, the scope of water banks in Spain is smaller, as it is a basin rather than the whole country. It would be similar to the water banks organized by local or regional organizations in the U.S. if it were not for the centralization effect: authorization by the central government cabinet is required before the River Basin Authority establishes them. Such an authorization can be quite broad. 11I. Since 1979, water conserved was not subject to forfeiture according to CAL. WATER CODE § 1011. In 1982, it was made clear that under this section water not used or conserved could be transferred without fear of forfeiture; it is considered that transferred water complies with the beneficial use requirement. However, those provisions were not enough. During the period this dissertation focuses on, the CAL. WATER CODE was amended several times to ensure that in the doctrine of beneficial use, conserved water or water unused as a result of fallowing for a transfer was not going to be considered waste and therefore the rights of the transferor could not be curtailed. In 1991, CAL. WATER CODE § 484(a) was introduced, which ensures that the water that the transferor would have used or stored could be transferable without being detrimental to him. Then in 1999, more provisions trying to increase certainty were enacted. The 1999 amendments emphasized that neither a transfer nor a proposed transfer could trigger any water rights review and that the only limitations which could be imposed must be a consequence of the transaction and tied to it. See § 1014. In fact, § 1011 could be seen as redundant because the 1999 reform also shifted the focus from the transferor to the transferee. So far as the transferee puts the water to beneficial use, it should not negatively affect the transferor's right. If the transferee violates the beneficial use requirement, the water reverts back to the transferor. See § 1015.
112. Guia Nueva Cultura del Agua, "Mercados pziblicos" paraga gestionar la escasez, http://www.fnca.eu/guia-nucva-cultura-del-agua/ a-economia-dcl-agua/mercados-publicos-para-gcstionar-la- This prior authorization can entail a delay in any reaction to a drought unless the authorization is granted in advance, as was the case for the three basins mentioned in 2004. It must be noted that it did not apply to all the basins. The time taken to overcome these bureaucratic hurdles may be precious time wasted in other cases. The nested nature-that is the decision to establish a bank and the authorization being decided at two different levels-and lack of permanency slow down the reaction to a crisis. For example, in the Segura Basin, it took more than two years fiorn the announcement to the actual implementation of the center.'
14 For the internal river basins in Catalonia, the Catalan Parliament included water exchange centers in the emergency decrees as a possibility.' 15 In the end, political will never materialized to bring them about and the Catalan Water Agency never implemented the exchange centers. Currently, in the different Spanish Drought Plans passed since 2007, several Confederaciones Hidrognificas include the exchange centers as a measure triggered by certain drought scenarios.
1 16 However, as stated, they cannot be automatically triggered, and this ends up being just programmatic: it is required that the central government gives them the green light beforehand.
As the 1991, the 1992, or the 1994 California Water Banks and Spanish centros de intercambio are not permanent, RBAs are allowed to set up Water Exchange Centers in exceptional circumstances: overexploitation of aquifers, severe drought, and instances where the uses should be limited to guaranteeing a rational exploitation of the resource. 117 The centers last only until the crisis is over. However, the authorization requirement previously discussed runs counter to the need to respond quickly to crisis. The 1991 Water Bank was organized in record time: California Governor Pete Wilson signed an Executive Order on February 1, 1991, establishing the Drought Action Team, which recommended setting up a Bank on its report issued February 15, 1991,118 and the Bank was working in less than one hundred days thanks to the quick response of the state government. 119 the tender, which includes, among other things, precise terms and a secret offer. This may reduce the pool of potential sellers. Additionally, it curtails the administrative discretion, like any other public procurement contract, in order to ensure that there are no corrupt practices. These requirements do not seem to target the needs of water management since they slow down the process and, in general, involve very little danger of favorable treatment because they would consist of buying or leasing atomized water rights to resell or release them. These constraints also curtail the flexibility of the administration since the time period between the offer publication, the reception of the tenders, and the resolution is quite long. In any case, the requirements imply that these banks have to operate in batches and the time period between offers and adjudications is too long to properly respond to a crisis. For example, in the Jucar Basin, an offer was published in the Official Gazette on December 2006, and the decision about which rights were leased was published on July 2007.121 Water banks are theoretically closer to spot markets; Spanish centros de intercambio are far from being so. Parties may not want such a slow process even if they could benefit from the guarantee. California water banks, like Spanish ones, fixed the price while decreasing transaction costs by providing sample contracts. In 1991 only one option was offered, while in 1992 there was a portfolio of contracts, which allowed a certain tailoring for the different transactions.1 2 2
Spanish centros de intercambio have never worked in real markets. Instead, they have been used as mechanisms for CHs to purchase water for the environment, much like the CALFED Environmental Water Account. 23 One of them, in the Guadiana basin, ended up reallocating the majority of the water rights to consumptive uses but not through market transactions. 24 In 1991, the California water bank acquired water for instream uses. The bank's main purpose was not environmental protection but the environment benefited because sales ended up being fewer than purchases; less users decided to buy water from the bank after the spring rains.1 25 Additionally, since 1991, in California, existing right-holders could transfer water to in-stream uses, 126 a possibility that does not exist in Spain. One commonality between these two jurisdictions concerning water banks is that factors other than market mechanisms (e.g., demand) are sometimes pursued to determine reallocation. In the Jucar basin, externalities affecting the environment or third parties are mitigated since the amount sold will be reduced to a certain percentage to be fixed in order will not provide proper public services. This means that the RBA has to issue a Public Offer of Acquisition calling for applications of those who want to lease their water and fulfill the requirements set forth in the offer. Those applications must be hand in before a deadline in secret envelopes. They are reviewed all at once and then the resolution of which ones will be. After that, the resolution of which ones will be bought will be publicized. to contribute to the recovery and maintenance of the water. 127 In California, 1991 Water
Bank buyers had to demonstrate that they were using current available water supplies at their maximum, implementing appropriate conservation practices. 128 Markets are supposed to encourage efficient use on both sides-buyers and sellers-because water will be properly priced and, thus, buyers would implement conservation measures if it is more efficient to do so. However, California's rules impose conservation requirements, which means that buyers may have had to implement water saving measures even if they were more expensive than actually buying water.
As the previous explanation has exposed, water markets in Spain, and consequently in Catalonia, have design flaws, and water agencies have lacked the will to make markets thrive. The following table summarizes those flaws and how California's experience has, if at all, addressed the same issues. Most of the design problems in the Spanish water market framework are not present in the California system, as the Golden State has done a better job with implementation. Nevertheless, lessons can be drawn for other water markets and for all U.S. Western states regarding the ability of certain drought emergency decisions to thwart or preempt markets, as the next section further discusses. Market maker: Water banks require several steps to Water banks were a game Water banks be set up. Those steps imply decichanger. They helped to insions by different levels of governtemalize the idea that water ment that causes delay and prevents markets are a permanent tool timely response to droughts. Water for water management. Not banks are subject to public procureonly water banks themselves ment regulations which do not suit decrease transaction costs bethe type of small transactions occur-cause the administration is ring.
Govern
the broker, but California water agencies learned after 1991 that offering forms and information further enhanced the performance of water markets.
V. CONCLUSION
This article provides a novel descriptive account of the geographic, political, governance, and institutional features related to water in Catalonia (Spain) in order to understand the options available to regions that face structural scarcity and periodical droughts. Accordingly, it further presents a case study of the 2007-2008 drought crises in Catalonia, which called into question the appropriateness of an administrative management system in controlling a scare resource. This article has analyzed the solutions that address supply and demand, which have been adopted in Catalonia, with special emphasis on one solution that did not play a role in the management of the drought crisis: water markets.
Spanish water markets presented a lot of design flaws, which prevented them from taking off as water management tools. Public agencies did not embrace them as tools to solve water misallocation and did not build expertise on how to oversee them. This, coupled with the lack of market culture (i.e. the reluctance that water users feel towards transferring their water), caused markets to become inactive, and prevented users from contributing to the mitigation of structural water scarcity. In addition, it is expected for water markets to be more active when there is a drought, but that was not the case during the 2007-2008 droughts, due to management through emergency measures.
In particular, in Catalonia, water markets were not welcomed, not even in the event of a crisis. To exactly understand what difference markets could make within an administrative regime, it is interesting to refer back to the management of the 2007-2008 drought in Barcelona. Household use was not curtailed in the city, but it could have been. It was nonetheless curtailed in some suburban areas where it was forbidden to irrigate lawns and fill pools. Transactions between agricultural producers and the cities could have prevented them. But the decrees mostly shielded urban areas and, thus, urban water suppliers did not have incentives to enter into water leases to mitigate the effects of the crisis.
Even if private parties did not shield themselves from a drought by entering into transactions before the crisis, water contracts could have corrected the restriction decisions made by the administrative agencies (who, during a drought, decide which types of uses should get water and which should not) without taking into account the specific marginal value. But, most cuts were suffered by agricultural areas, and the anticipation of such discretionary restrictions may have cast uncertainty about who would get water. Thus, transactions were prevented in advance. In addition, as section IV.C has analyzed, the Spanish regulation of water markets also prevents private parties from responding quickly to a crisis.
The Catalan Emergency Decree's provision establishing water banks was never implemented. Instead, mandated transfers seemed to be the default rule. The transfers between the Ebro or Segre and the Barcelona Metropolitan area, sponsored by Spanish and Catalan authorities respectively, were framed by certain officials as potential exchange frameworks, but such an approach was not accepted. Instead, it was pretended that there was surplus water, and transfers were mandated. However, transfers were not real solutions because the Ebro and Segre rivers, despite not being in an acute state, did not have enough water. As these rivers suffer from a Mediterranean climate similar to the Internal Basins, there was not surplus water in the long term. If a market would have been established, water that would have been used anyway that could have transfer from low value users to cities, thus alleviating the problem. Infrastructure was discussed to allow the mandated transfers, which could have also provided the channels allowing for the operation of water banks or private contracts. Furthermore, in the long run, infrastructure use is relatively inexpensive, and temporary or permanent water contracts could have taken place allowing agents to permanently ensure their supplies or plans for potential water shortages. However, the infrastructure was not built. Mandated transfers have a history of discontent which made them highly unpopular even amidst a drought and water markets had not been embraced as a tool of water management, neither by private users nor by public agencies.
The unplanned administrative response to drought crisis negatively affects the role that water markets may have in the future, under both normal and drought conditions, because it creates uncertainty about who will receive water. This same problem can occur in any Western state where agencies undertake the same use restrictions. In its 2014 emergency measures, California, which already has a better water market design (even though [Vol. 51:731 it recently adopted cuts), included provisions aimed at reducing the costs of water transactions by streamlining the administrative review procedure. 129 Also, in contrast with the ineffective provisions in Catalonia's emergency decrees about water banks, water banks have played a great role in California. While under Spanish regulations procedural requirements make those banks unsuited to fulfill their purported goal (i.e. mitigate drought scenarios), water banks in California have been an example of quick response and have improved in every water shortage experience. Beginning in 2007, Spanish basins started designing and enacting Drought Preparedness Plans. Thus, the future will prove whether predictability is achieved with those documents or whether uncertainty will still exist because emergency measures will still rule during drought crisis. Some of those plans have included water transactions and water banks among their emergency measures. Perhaps Spain learned the lesson, but in this learning process fifteen years of experience on how to better articulate water markets has been lost.
Regarding drought planning, the situation west of the 100th meridian is unequal. States such as Nevada, California, or New Mexico extensively discuss drought preparedness in their water plans. Meanwhile, others, such as Utah or Idaho, have little to no discussion of drought preparedness in their plans. Furthermore, Colorado and a few other states have specific plans to deal with droughts. Regardless of a state's plan, emergency measures are likely to play a role. If measures are enacted beyond what the Drought Preparedness Plan established in Spain, they should be crafted in such a way that enhances the role that water markets could play.
129. Governor Jerry Brown of California included provisions in his decrees to reduce transaction costs to enlist water market transactions in the state's strategy to mitigate the effects of the drought even though water for urban consumers was ensured. Among other pro-transfer measures adopted, the package streamlined the review procedure by exempting water transfers from California Environmental Quality Act Review. The measure has been criticized by environmentalists and, rightly so, because it tries to enhance water transactions lowering the barriers that protect the environment. The haste of the measure may explain this reaction. Perhaps the measures to enhance markets should be thought through and enacted with a long-term view while ensuring a stable framework that deals with situations of low availability of water.
